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When Preservationism Doesn't Preserve

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ABSTRACT: According to conservationism, scarce and precious resources should be conserved and used wisely. According to preservation ethics, we should not think of wilderness as merely a resource. Wilderness commands reverence in a way mere resources do not. Each philosophy, I argue, can fail by its own lights, because trying to put the principles of conservationism or preservationism into institutional practice can have results that are the opposite of what the respective philosophies tell us we ought to be trying to achieve. For example, if the wisest use of South American rainforests is no use at all, then in that case conservationism by its own lights defers to preservationism. Analogously, if, when deprived of the option of preserving elephants as a resource, Africans respond by not preserving elephants at all, then in that case preservationism by its own lights defers to conservationism.

KEYWORDS: Animal rights, elephant hunting, moral theory, virtue ethics

I. PRESERVATION AND CONSERVATION

Is it okay to chop down a Redwood so that you can take a picture of people dancing on the stump? Is it okay to shoot an elephant so that you can carve the tusks into fancy ivory chess pieces? Probably not. What exactly is wrong with such things, though? That is a tougher question, and there is a controversy in environmental ethics over how to answer it.

One approach is what we call conservationism. The idea is that elephants and Redwoods are a precious resource, too precious to waste on trifles. Scarce and precious resources should be conserved. They should be used wisely, taking into account costs and benefits for future generations as well as our own. Chopping down a Redwood so you can take pictures of people dancing on the stump is a waste: a waste of lumber or of a tourist attraction.

What if it is not a waste, though? What if the lumber is used efficiently and the tree stump dance floor itself becomes a major tourist attraction – a source of

human happiness for generations to come? Wouldn't it still be wrong? Don't Redwoods somehow deserve more *respect* than that? Among people who do environmental ethics, conservationism has to some degree been supplanted by a second approach, which we call preservationism. Although we cannot avoid exploiting the natural world to some extent, preservationism's core idea is that nature has a moral status that is independent of its utility for humankind. Thus, it can be argued that there are some ecosystems that should simply be left alone to evolve according to their own lights, free of human use and human interference. The slogan for conservationism is 'wise use'. The slogan for preservationism is 'let it be'. According to preservation ethics, we should not think of wilderness as merely a resource. Wilderness commands reverence in a way mere resources do not.

One concern a preservationist might have about conservation ethics, then, is that it fails to make room for reverence. There are other, more contingent reasons as well. First, we ought to be sceptical about wise use policies regarding resources whose range of potential uses is largely unknown. 'Wise use' of rain forests, for example, might not be very wise in the long term because there might be goods we do not know about yet that we are unwittingly squandering. Second, there might be other goods, like atmospheric oxygen, that rain forests would go on producing for us if we just left them alone. In that case, *using* a resource interferes with *benefiting* from it. Third, 'wise use' of rain forests might be exposing us to diseases that otherwise would have stayed in the rain forests. My wife is a biochemist who works on mosquitoes. She tells me there are species of mosquitoes that live only in the rain forest canopy. They feed only on monkeys that live in the canopy and they transmit diseases only to those monkeys. When you chop down the trees, though, those mosquitoes are suddenly on the forest floor where they have never been before. They and the organisms they carry are suddenly exposed to a population of five billion human beings. It would not be like them to let that much food go to waste.

So, there are reasons why people could plausibly claim that the only wise use of rain forests is virtually no use at all, at least for now. And when wise use is tantamount to no use at all, we have a situation where preservationism has won out on conservationism's own grounds. It is no surprise, then, that many (perhaps most) environmental ethicists today view conservationism as an ethic whose time has passed.¹ My sympathies, too, lie primarily (although not exclusively) with preservationism.

However, a book by a journalist named Raymond Bonner has forced me to rethink the wisdom of preservationism.² Bonner was in Africa on other business when he stumbled into an ugly debate over the legitimacy of the ivory trade. This paper's purpose is not to take sides in that debate but rather to do something more philosophical: to reflect on what the observations of Bonner and others reveal about the practical limitations of preservationist philosophy.

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If you were writing a Hollywood movie script, you would have the bad guys being in favour of shooting elephants for ivory (at 'sustainable levels' of course). The good guys would argue that elephants are the world's sacred and priceless heritage and that it is a moral crime to be hacking their faces off and turning their tusks into trinkets. That is how you would be expected to write the script and that is just what Bonner expected to find. What he actually found was something quite different.

II. HARD-LINE PRESERVATIONISM

Guy Grant bought his ranch in Kenya in 1963. He had twenty-five zebra at the time. Today he has over a thousand. He once sold hunting rights to zebra, elephant, buffalo, and warthogs, which provided a third of his income. In any case, he needs to keep the zebra population down to have room to graze cattle. Sport hunting, however, was banned in 1977. He could not sell hunting licenses any more, so he had to hunt zebra himself. He still made money selling meat and hides, but trade in wildlife products was banned in 1978, so he lost that income too. Now, because of the ban, he has to graze more cattle to make ends meet (Bonner 1993: 217). And he still has to keep the zebra population down. Otherwise it will bankrupt him. The only change is that he cannot make money from the zebra. Think about what that means. Without income from zebra, Grant has to graze more cattle to make the same money, which means he has less room for zebra, which means he has to shoot more zebra than otherwise would be necessary. *More zebra get shot* because of the ban on hunting them for sport.

The situation on Guy Grant's ranch was not unique. For better or worse, Kenya had become one of Africa's most enlightened countries, at least in terms of paying lip service to preservationist ideals. Wildlife in general was protected by law. Even outside the national parks, hunting was tightly regulated. In particular, poaching elephants in Kenya was as illegal as dealing cocaine in Brooklyn. Unfortunately, it also was as common.

What do you do when your laws are treated with contempt? Naturally, you want to get tough on crime. That is what voters want. That is what lobbyists want. And that is what they got. In 1988, Kenya's president ordered that poachers be shot on sight (Bonner 1993: 17). Forty-one suspected poachers were killed in the next eight months. No park rangers were killed. In Zimbabwe, with the same shoot-to-kill policy, one hundred and forty-five suspected poachers were killed between 1984 and 1991. Four rangers were killed in the same time frame.

The trouble is, when the score in favour of the game wardens is forty-one to zero in one country and one hundred and forty-five to four in another, it begins to seem unlikely that the alleged poachers were well-armed, war-hardened mercenaries. In fact, it was average rural peasants who were being shot.

According to Richard Leakey, director of Kenya's wildlife department, there were no more than a hundred hard-core poachers in Kenya and for the most part, their identities were known.³ Many of them were wildlife department rangers; by some accounts, over a third of the rhinos poached in the 1970s, when the population crashed from 20,000 to under 1,000, were taken by members of the wildlife department itself.⁴ It occurs to me that if you are a game warden and some hard-luck farmer chasing a stray goat accidentally catches you sawing tusks off an elephant you have poached, it is awfully convenient to have a legal right to shoot him. You have the carcass right there as proof that he was poaching. However we explain the statistics, though, the fact remains that the shoot-to-kill policy was an extreme response – a reactionary response – and it did not work. Lots of farmers were getting shot, yet all sides agreed that poaching was escalating (*Ibid.*: 19).

What else could you do? One suggestion: regulate trade in ivory. The Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species determined in 1977 that elephants were not yet an endangered species but would become so if the ivory trade were not brought under control. The Convention proposed that each exporting country establish self-imposed quotas on ivory exports, based on sustainable off-take – a level consistent with maintaining existing populations.

What happened? To give one example, in 1986, Somalia voluntarily limited its export quota to seventeen thousand tusks per year. The odd thing is that Somalia had only six thousand elephants to begin with. Where were all those tusks coming from? Probably Kenya, its neighbour to the southwest (Bonner 1993: 96).

If regulating commerce in ivory does not work, how about totally banning it? The case against a ban is this: Elephant populations in many countries were not decreasing, and were in fact near carrying capacity. Ivory was an important source of revenue for conservation programs. Legal exports from countries like South Africa dampen demand for poached ivory from countries like Kenya where elephants are threatened (*Ibid.*: 91). For better or worse, these considerations ultimately failed to carry the day. The World Wide Fund for Nature and the African Wildlife Foundation originally were opposed to a ban for the reasons just mentioned, but in the end they could not afford to pass up the millions of dollars they stood to gain through highly publicised campaigns to ban ivory.

Here is a different issue. Even if the ivory ban eliminated poaching entirely, the wildlife would still be disappearing (*Ibid.*: 212). In Theodore Roosevelt's time, Africa's human population was 100 million. Now it is 450 million.⁵ Competition for water, disruption of migration routes, and farmers defending crops (and their families) against marauding wildlife will decimate wildlife with or without poaching. Clearly, the poaching has to stop, but in the long run, that will not be enough to save the elephants. Whether we like it or not, the elephants will not survive except by sharing the land with people, which means their long-term survival depends on whether the people of Africa can afford to share. Poaching is just one symptom of this larger problem.

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III. THE LARGER PROBLEM

As Laura Westra tells us, 'An Arab proverb says, Before the palm tree can be beautiful, our bellies must be full of dates. It is a truism, as indeed survival comes before aesthetic enjoyment. Unfortunately environmental concern is seen as aesthetic preference rather than urgently needed for survival ...'⁶ Accordingly, the view that environmental concern is a mere luxury is unjustified. However, there is a crucial complication: people like us, for whom short-term survival is not an issue, can afford to treat environmental concern as an urgent priority; people who can barely make ends meet from one day to the next cannot. That is true here, and it is true in Africa as well. Being able to think in terms of long-term survival is itself a luxury of a kind, and not one that everyone can afford. So, Westra has a point when she says it would be a mistake to view environmental issues as a luxury. At the same time, it also would be a mistake to ignore the fact that environmental concern tends to fall by the wayside in a personal crunch.

Presumably, there are exceptions to this general rule. For example, Ramachandra Guha cringes at the depiction of environmental concern as a 'full stomach' phenomenon and makes note of peasant movements against deforestation and industrial pollution in India.⁷ Guha's point is well-taken, but it bears adding that, as Guha himself stresses, 'environmental protection is of least concern to most of these groups. Their main concern is about the use of the environment and who should benefit from it'.⁸ Thus, the point remains that, even if our own attitude is one of deep and unconditional reverence for wilderness, we have to be aware that other people may have, in their own eyes, more pressing things to think about. If we really care about wilderness, we cannot just look at it through our own eyes. Part of our job is to help create the kind of society in which, for other people, from their perspectives, respecting wilderness is worth the cost. We can say preservation is morally right; therefore the Maasai tribes are morally obligated to preserve; therefore we should not have to bribe them to do what they are obligated to do. They should just do it. If we say that, though, we are kidding ourselves. Under such circumstances, David Western observes, 'the African farmer's enmity toward elephants is as visceral as western mawkishness is passionate'.⁹

Like us, the people of Africa care for their natural heritage when they can afford to do so, when rewards for doing so go to them and not just to others, and when they know how to do so. Some of them have been practising wise use for a long time, killing wildlife when it threatens their families, hunting it for food, and for sport as well. When we try to impose our preservationist ideals on local villagers who have to live with wildlife, we risk starting a war between locals and wildlife, a war that both sides lose. The problem is that preservation ethics does not allow the local people to profit from wildlife, and not allowing people to profit from wildlife effectively pits people against wildlife, which is bad for wildlife as well as the local people. According to Brian Child, 'the simple fact is that wildlife will survive in Africa only where it can compete financially for

space. The real threat to wildlife is poverty, not poaching'.¹⁰ With equal bluntness, Norman Myers says, 'In emergent Africa, you either use wildlife or lose it. If it pays its own way, some of it will survive.'¹¹

Kreuter and Simmons conclude that, because elephants 'compete directly with humans for use of fertile land, we believe elephants will continue to be eliminated unless they provide ... direct personal benefits to the people who incur the cost of coexisting with them. If the western preservationists do not respect the need for Africans to benefit from their resources, they will one day stand justly accused of promoting rather than abating the demise of Africa's elephants'.¹² This begins to suggest that the hard choice is not so much between people and wildlife as between a pragmatic humanism that benefits both and an idealistic environmentalism that benefits neither. When it comes to African wildlife, preservation ethics runs into a problem. In a nutshell, preservationism does not preserve. It thereby fails by its own lights. We need alternatives. It turns out that there are many. Some of them are working.¹³

IV. WISE USE ALTERNATIVES

A. Namibia's Auxiliary Guard

In several countries, elephant numbers are increasing. Is it because of the ivory ban? That seems reasonable, but it does not explain why the numbers in some countries were increasing even before the ban. Nor does it explain why the numbers have increased only in some countries, not others. One variable that separates countries is their success in controlling poaching. (And the successful countries seem to be those that understand that poaching is a symptom of more fundamental problems.) In contrast to Kenya, Namibia's Kaokoveld, for example, seems to be doing fairly well. In 1982, a conservation officer named Garth Owen-Smith diagnosed Namibia's problem as follows. Local villagers once had customs that effectively limited their own hunting activities to sustainable levels. Then foreign hunters started showing up in large numbers. It was a classic tragedy of the commons. Self-restraint seemed pointless, and villagers did not restrain themselves. They were helping to destroy wildlife and were destroying their own future in the process, and it was partly their fault. Somehow, the villagers had to reverse the deterioration of their own social norms, and they had to do something about trespassing poachers from outside. Owen-Smith felt that shooting the villagers would not solve the problem. Instead, he asked them for help.

He asked village headmen to assemble troops of auxiliary guards to act as neighbourhood watch organisations. These watchdog organisations radically reduced poaching by outsiders, and also provided an institutional framework that made it easy to reassert community standards and re-establish norms of self-

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restraint. It was a simple idea, but it worked. Five years later, Owen-Smith went further. By then elephants, lions, and other animals were returning to the Kaokoveld, and with them came the tourists. The plan (Bonner 1993: 31-3) was to sell crafts to visitors who were coming through mainly to see wildlife and to tax visitors for overnight stays within their territory. Both sources of income ultimately are tied to wildlife, so incentives to preserve are put in place.¹⁴

B. Kenya Parks Revenue Sharing

To Westerners, the commercial value of tourism is a panacea (Bonner 1993: 218). Tourism could indeed help, but it depends on how the money is distributed. In Kenya, Richard Leakey announced in 1990 that 25% of entrance fees will go to local Maasai tribes (Ibid.: 222). Involving the Maasai is crucial, since 80% of Kenya's wildlife lives outside of its parks, and much of it is migratory. Thus, it is imperative that local farmers and herdsman tolerate big animals coming and going, circulating among seasonal food and water supplies. And they *were* tolerant, after they started to get some of the money. In fact, the Maasai now use some of their share to hire their own wardens to protect animals outside the park – a remarkable change of attitude.

C. Tanzania's Bounty Hunters

In the Maswa Preserve, near Serengeti, Robin Hurt once led hunting safaris. Tanzania banned hunting in 1973, so Hurt went elsewhere. Tanzania legalised hunting again in 1984. Robin Hurt came back in 1985. During that twelve year moratorium on hunting, the wildlife virtually disappeared. Why? Because of poachers. Without the licensed hunters to keep poachers in line, the poachers ran amok.

But what is the difference between a poacher and a hunter? A hunter is just a poacher by another name, no? In fact, the difference is enormous. Hunters hunt with rifles. In Tanzania, poachers hunt with *snares*, and snares are a disaster for the wildlife (Bonner 1993: 236). The people of Makao, for example, were laying snares around water holes, or along timeworn paths to water holes, or they would cut new paths in the bushes and lay snares along those. Robin Hurt found twenty lion skulls in one snare line. He found snare lines that ran for two miles. More often than not, the animal caught is not what the poacher wants. Even if it is, vultures or hyenas often get to the animal before the poacher does. Snare-hunting is extremely wasteful, but it is a lot easier than hunting with bow and arrow. The Makao switched to snares.

When Hurt resumed operations in 1985, he began a casual anti-poaching effort, picking up snares as he went, in his spare time. Gradually realising the magnitude of the problem, he concluded that the Makao had to be enlisted. How?

Well, why not just pay them to turn in snares and poachers? I myself would have worried about incentive problems. (If Hurt pays too much for the snares, won't people respond by increasing production?) Still, it was an idea worth trying. Hurt raised enough money to try it, and it worked (Ibid.: 249).

D. Zimbabwe's Local Autonomy

There had been lots of problems in Zimbabwe, as in other countries, with wildlife molesting villagers (Bonner 1993: 255), to the point where villagers came to feel they were being persecuted for the sake of the animals. And they were basically right. One major effect of the bans was to prevent locals from making significant money. Wildlife groups had failed to ask: What could make it *rational* for villagers to choose wildlife over cattle? (Ibid.: 259-61)

Here is one answer. In 1989, local residents of Nyaminyami, in northwestern Zimbabwe, were granted authority over wildlife in their district (Ibid.: 253). They can cull herds, sell hunting permits, or set up tourist ventures, and they keep almost all of the money. They put some of it in a fund for compensating farmers when lions take their goats or elephants trample their corn, which immediately defuses much of the resentment of wildlife. Rangers periodically hunt impala and sell meat to local villagers at a price that covers cost of the hunt, making villagers less dependent on cattle as a source of protein. The issue is not just money, but self-sufficiency. In Nyaminyami, decisions are made in the village square. In that setting, people have more knowledge, more understanding, more voice. There is less room for corruption. Decision-making is more efficient and more equitable (Ibid.: 277).

The result is that so much more money is now coming in from hunting that villagers are better off turning their land over to wildlife rather than grazing cattle (Ibid.: 276). This is crucial because the bigger threat to wildlife tends to be cattle, not hunting. Cattle crowds out wildlife.¹⁵ It remains illegal to sell ivory, but villages do sell elephant hunting licenses, recently for \$3750 each. If the villages had been able to sell the ivory as well, it would have meant an additional twenty-five percent increase in their per capita income (Ibid.: 271).

What about the morality of sport hunting? Is it something a sane person would do? Winston Churchill once shot a rhinoceros, but failed to kill it. The wounded rhino charged. The hunting party opened fire. The rhino kept coming into a hail of bullets, swerving aside at the last moment before more bullets finally brought it down. Churchill later wrote that, even in the midst of the charge, 'There is time to reflect with some detachment that, after all, we it is who have forced the conflict by an unprovoked assault with murderous intent upon a peaceful herbivore; that if there is such a thing as right and wrong between man and beast – and who shall say there is not? – right is plainly on his side.'¹⁶

Like Churchill, I find something appalling about sport hunting. Nevertheless, we should hesitate before concluding that regular tourism is benign whereas

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hunting is destructive. Actually, tourism may do more damage than hunting relative to the money it brings in. Why? Mainly because, dollar for dollar, hunting does not need nearly as much infrastructure as tourism does (Bonner 1993: 244). Hunters in jeeps do not use precious water the way tourist hotels do, and do not demand wilderness-fragmenting highways the way tourist hotels do.

V. ANIMAL RIGHTS

I have been talking about selling hunting licenses as an alternative to grazing cattle that compete with wildlife for space. As things stand, though, it sometimes is necessary to cull elephant herds for straightforwardly ecological reasons – to preserve habitat, other animal species, and even the elephants themselves. In the Volcans National Park in Rwanda, for example, a choice had to be made between elephants and gorillas (Bonner 1993: 102). As the elephants deplete food sources in the park, they would normally migrate, coming back only when the park had replenished itself. As human populations increase and human settlements surround the parks, though, elephants are forced to turn back into the parks, destroying habitat for everything else in the park as well as for themselves. To prevent that, Rwanda's two remaining elephant herds, about seventy animals each, were wiped out in 1973.¹⁷

Uganda also culled elephant herds for ecological reasons. Not Kenya. The elephant population in Kenya's Tsavo Park had reached forty thousand in the 1960s. 'Some conservationists and wildlife officials wanted to cull three thousand elephants. Others argued that man should do nothing, that nature should be allowed to take its course' (Ibid.: 104). Preservationists prevailed, but during a subsequent drought, six to nine thousand elephants died of starvation, and they took several hundred rhinos with them.¹⁸

Today, in Amboseli Park in Kenya, the same thing is happening again. Elephants are ruining the woodland. Do we have the right to put a stop to it? Animal rights organisations say no. Their approach is individualistic rather than holistic. They focus on each and every animal rather than on larger questions about species or habitat (Ibid.: 105). Their view is particularly salient in the case of culling elephants. The horrible thing is that elephants are smart – probably smart enough to know roughly what is happening when the culling begins.¹⁹ Cynthia Moss, who has written several fascinating and convincing books about what it is like to be an elephant, says elephants deserve something better than to be exterminated like rodents. She has a point.²⁰

As Lawrence Johnson argues, though, there are times when 'the interests of species are not adequately protected by a concern for individuals'.²¹ The individualistic animal rights position is a powerful position, given the nature of elephants, but it leaves us in a horrible quandary, for the price of absolute rights may be extinction. Nonetheless, elephants are not like zebra. They are not the

kind of creature that we have a right to treat as mere means. Cynthia Moss (*Ibid.*: 226) said she would rather see elephants go extinct than see individual animals murdered for sake of population control, and she is not alone. If elephants had a voice in the matter, perhaps they would thank Moss for her stand. Perhaps not.

VI. PERSONAL AND INTERPERSONAL MORALITY

I started out by asking what makes it wrong to cut down a Redwood in order to use the stump as a dance floor, or to shoot an elephant in order to use the tusks for ivory. Do we have an answer? We may have more than one. I say that partly because, in my view, morality is more than one thing.²² One part of morality ranges over the subject of personal aspiration – which goals we should spend our lives trying to achieve. Another part of morality ranges over the subject of interpersonal constraint – particularly which socially or institutionally embedded constraints we ought to respect as we pursue our goals in a social setting. In those terms, then, my point is that I still believe in preservationism as part of a morality of personal aspiration. What I mean by this is that committing ourselves to preservationist ideals – to reverence for nature and to a policy of ‘no use at all’ at least in some contexts – is one route by which we can settle on ends that shape our lives and characters, giving us a sense of having something to live for and being something worth living for.

I also believe a preservationist ‘no use at all’ policy can work among people who share a commitment to preservationist ideals. What I mean by this is that when people accept the ideals behind a set of institutional constraints, and individually and collectively commit themselves to living within those constraints on behalf of those ideals, the institution has an excellent chance of functioning in such a way as to actually further those ideals.

However, I have come to accept that preservationism often, and predictably, does not work in the context of a social arrangement in which the cost of upholding preservationist ideals has to be born by people who do not embrace those ideals. For what it is worth, I consider the ideal universalisable, at least under some circumstances, but whether it can be universalised is beside the point. The issue at hand is what to do when it is not in fact universalised – when people do not in fact share the ideal. Even given that preservationism is acceptable as a personal ideal, it remains a bad idea to create institutions that rely upon people who do not share that ideal to take responsibility for realising it.²³

I have argued that conservationism and preservationism each can fail by its own lights, in the sense that trying to put the principles of conservationism or preservationism into institutional practice could have results that are the opposite of what the respective philosophies tell us we ought to be trying to achieve. These are particular instances of a more general truth: attempts to put a

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consequentialist principle into institutional practice can be a bad idea by the lights of the principle itself. That is to say, in a particular setting it could be right to try to put a consequentialist principle into institutional practice, but that will depend, by the principle's own lights, on whether doing so will make things better. And whether doing so makes things better depends on circumstances.²⁴

Virtue ethics, as Thomas Hill tells us, treats as central the question 'What kind of person would do that?'²⁵ Virtue ethics is sometimes presented as an alternative to consequentialism, but construing it as such puts virtue ethics in an awkward position. After all, what kind of person would ignore consequences? A virtuous person is (among other things) looking for a pattern of consequences, and is asking what kind of person would participate in that pattern. That is part of the reason why a virtuous person does not litter – why a virtuous person will see littering as a character flaw. But it may also be part of the reason why some of the most beloved of our environmental heroes were themselves unrepentant hunters. They saw hunting as part of an environmentally benign overall pattern. I am not sure elephant hunting can be looked at in that way. On the other hand, it would be neither virtuous nor environmentally benign to interfere with hunting by other people if and when such hunting is the heart of a system of financial incentives that allows people and wildlife to live together in some semblance of harmony.

NOTES

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¹ For example, see Katz and Oechsli 1993.

² Bonner 1993. His sources include interviews, memos, minutes of committee meetings, and newsletters. I have not seen these sources myself, but Bonner's reporting is internally consistent and also consistent, except where otherwise noted, with the sources I have been able to check.

³ Bonner 1993: 18. His source is a (publicly circulated) report by Leakey to the U.S. State Department in 1989.

⁴ Bonner 1993: 134. If it seems astonishing both that this could be true and that Leakey would publicly admit it, consider two things, as reported by Bonner. First, there was pervasive corruption at the highest levels of government, allowing well-connected poachers to operate with impunity. (Indeed, rangers sometimes were required to poach at the bidding of senior officials lest they lose their jobs or worse.) Second, many of the rangers were paid less than a living wage, so it was need, not greed, that drove some of

them to poach. For both reasons, Leakey sometimes had little choice but to put up with poaching within his own ranks. See also Cumming and du Toit 1989.

⁵ As Bonner puts it, 'People were once an island in a sea of wildlife. Now wildlife survives in parks that are islands in an ocean of people' (p. 8).

⁶ Westra 1990, p. 232.

⁷ Guha 1989, pp. 79-81.

⁸ Ibid., p. 81. Guha here is quoting Agarwal 1986, p. 167.

⁹ Western 1993, p. 52.

¹⁰ Child 1993, p. 60.

¹¹ Myers 1981, p. 36.

¹² Kreuter and Simmons 1995, p. 161.

¹³ One obvious solution is simply to transfer massive amounts of wealth from more productive economies to the people of Africa. It is possible that an infusion of investment in infrastructure could be beneficial. The long term solution, though, if there is a solution, will involve helping the people of Africa develop healthy local economies.

¹⁴ Does the program demean wildlife? Perhaps. If we worry about demeaning elephants, we should keep in mind that we are not talking here about locking them up in zoos. Elephants have their value to the local people to the extent that they are wild and free and living in a natural setting. That is what the tourists (and hunters) are paying to see.

¹⁵ Actually, pastoral herds are one problem; farms and ranches are another. Nomadic Maasai herdsmen compete with wildlife for space and water, but at least they do not cut off migration routes by erecting fences or otherwise defending their turf. See Moss 1988, pp. 209, 301.

¹⁶ Churchill 1908, p. 17.

¹⁷ Haigh, Parker, Parkinson and Archer 1979.

¹⁸ The figure of nine thousand is from Bonner. The figure of six thousand is from Botkin 1990, p. 18.

¹⁹ Moss 1988, p. 316.

²⁰ Moss 1988, p. 317.

²¹ Johnson 1991, p. 173.

²² I develop a moral theory, along lines only hinted at in this article, in *Rational Choice and Moral Agency* (1995).

²³ According to Guha (1989: 55-6), our foisting preservationist ideals on third world countries is a form of imperialism. But for an uncompromising response, see Katz and Oechsli 1993, p. 55-9.

²⁴ Some might be surprised to see conservationism and preservationism lumped together as consequentialist theories. Some people may see the preservationist slogan 'let it be' as a bit of absolutist deontology and would try to enforce it no matter what the consequences. But those who want to leave elephants alone as a means to the end of preserving elephants have to recognise that trying to force others to stop treating elephants as a resource could make things worse.

²⁵ See Hill 1983, pp. 211-24.

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